In 1977, Deleuze and Foucault found themselves in opposite camps in the public dispute among French intellectuals, resulting in a parting of the ways between two colleagues who had for many years been friends. Deleuze considered the reason for the split to have been their differing ideas on the connection between the historical situation and philosophical thought; in his view, it was occasioned by the debate over the New Philosophers, in which Foucault supported those intellectuals who, according to Deleuze, opposed the creative thinking of philosophy. After Foucault's death, Deleuze sought to reconcile the two positions, but his attempts only highlighted the depth of the division between them.
Introduction
There was a point in time, wrote Deleuze in 1990, before which he had been a political follower of Foucault, and after which he no longer shared Foucault's "evaluation" of many issues. confrontation with the paintings of Francis Bacon and with cinema. In What is Philosophy?, his final book, he and Guattari developed a conception of philosophy as creative thinking. As a successor of Nietzsche, Deleuze rejected the assumption of an immutable foundation of the world, arguing that our world is not a moving image of eternity, as in Plato, but rather a movementimage, without any relation to eternity.
Even during the period that Deleuze and Foucault were working together as friends, each one's thought differed considerably from the other's. One example is the conversation entitled "Intellectuals and Power" (1972) , in which they jointly grapple with the following question: How are the entanglements of power that organize and shape our society and experience constituted, and how is it possible to extract oneself from these entanglements or resist them? Whereas
Deleuze declares that theory and praxis are entangled in that together they form a multitude of relays, Foucault stresses that theory is a praxis. For Deleuze, theory by its nature extricates itself from organization through power; for Foucault, it is a form of the struggle against power. 2 The background to this conversation was the Groupe d'information sur les prisons, which was formed at Foucault's initiative in 1971 and which Deleuze also joined. This group sought to support prisoners by publicizing and fighting against the conditions prevailing in French prisons. As Foucault said, the task of the intellectual was not to reveal the truth about prevailing sociopolitical structures to others, but rather to undermine power and utilize it for the purpose of defending oneself in particular instances against prohibitions and constraints, surveillance and control. The primary plane of which Deleuze speaks is an immanent diagram of forces, a microscopic plane. The second plane, by contrast, is the organizing network of power, a macroscopic plane. "In any case, there is heterogeneity, a difference in the nature between micro and macro, which in no way excludes the immanence of the two. So, my question would be the following: Does this difference in nature allow us to keep talking about dispositives of power?" (in: Gilles Deleuze: Desire and Pleasure, p. 119, translation modified). Deleuze does not want to describe an assemblage permeated by the two planes as a dispositive of power, because the dispositive of power only spans one of these planes, and, furthermore, the one that only knows a limited productivity. by its contradictions." 9 A social field must first and foremost be described by its movements of change and renewal, not by the prevailing relations of power or the resistance offered to these relations.
The Odd Term of Power
The dispositives of power form the historical state of society, but in order to do so, in Deleuze's view, they must suppress the renewal movements emerging from the creative forces. He therefore presupposes precisely that primary plane that he considers to be missing in Foucault. The relations of power only ever emerge from fundamental interplays of forces, precisely because they implement these as effective relations of power and consolidate them there. Only on the plane of forces it is possible for something totally new to emerge as a result of new interplays of forces. The relations of power can change when the new creation finds a correlation in the sociopolitical field, in the given historical situation. 10 Accordingly, the task of the intellectual or rather of the philosopher or the artist, does not directly consist of generating resistance. 11 In
Deleuze's view, anyone who believes that the philosopher can deploy the mechanisms of power against themselves more easily than can any other individual, that he can put power out of action, has succumbed to an illusion. Deleuze stresses that capitalism, state and religion, opinion and the media are powers, but that philosophy is not. Philosophy cannot win in a direct fight against these powers, and so wages a minor war from a position of concealment. Deleuze: Desire and Pleasure, p. 127. 10 As such, Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 that "May '68 was not the result of a crisis, nor was it a reaction to a crisis. It is rather the opposite. It is the current crisis, the impasses of the current crisis in France that stem directly from the inability of French society to assimilate May '68." (in: Deleuze: May '68 Did Not Take Place [French 1984] , in: Two Regimes of Madness, pp. 233-236, here p. 234). 11 Deleuze himself declared that Foucault's problem was how it could be that the organization of the relations of power does not lead to an ossification of society, and how it was possible to resist this organization. His own problem, by contrast, was how it could be that renewal movements and refugee movements did not lead to the dissolution of society, and how it was possible for the prevailing relations to maintain their organization. See Deleuze: Foucault and Prison [1986] pleasure of a particular subject of experience. It represses desire, but at the same time is constitutive of the individual subject that feels this pleasure. With pleasure, then, the organizational strategy of power enters the body. his The Master Thinkers. Only a month after this review, Deleuze circulated a short treatise on the New Philosophers, in which he mercilessly unmasked them. As he did not want to turn to the media, he decided to publish the text and distribute free copies in bookstores. In the treatise, Deleuze analysed how journalism was changing as a result of marketing becoming ever more important. Television and radio talks, discussions, and interviews often counted for more than the books being discussed. Audiovisual media in particular gave journalism the power to control opinion through surveys, to determine the importance of different incidents, and even to generate several incidents on its own. Deleuze talked of "a new type of thought, the interviewthought, the conversation-thought, the sound bite-thought." 17 He realized that the New Philos-15 Regarding desire and pleasure, Deleuze defines the first of the two very different types of planes as the body-without-organs.
This type of plane "opposes all strata of organization" that "will impose upon desire another type of plane, each time stratifying the body-without-organs. ophers, in trying to utilize the power of the media for themselves, were encouraging the surrender of thought to the media. They were reducing thought to the form of the interview, and jumping on all creative thinking in order to inhibit it. "This marketing enterprise represents the submission of thought to the media. By the same token, thought offers the media a minimum intellectual guarantee and peace of mind to stifle any attempts at creation which would make the media themselves evolve."
18
In his review of The Master Thinkers, Foucault praised Glucksmann for not wanting to refute thought with a different thought, nor to wrap it in contradictions; he saw Glucksmann's intent as to "confront [thought] face-to-face with the real that imitates it, to stick its nose in this blood which the thought abhors, absolves and justifies."
19 What Glucksmann actually does is to put thought, and philosophy in particular, into direct contact with historical occurrences. He reverses a simple view of how Marxism bases ideology and the corresponding forms of consciousness on social relations. Borrowing from Foucault, Glucksmann speaks of "a strategy of the text turned into law," which prescribes a particular structure of society and binds individuals into this structure through various mechanisms of power. 20 Unlike Foucault, however, he equates these mechanisms of power with the state apparatus: in his view, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche wrote the original text of the German nation-state in the nineteenth century. They gradually developed the strategy that prepared the ground for the Nazis, pressing for the establishment of a German state, committing German society to a revolution of its own, and providing the instruments of knowledge, "the mental apparatus which is indispensable for launching the grand final solutions of the twentieth century." 21 Glucksmann blamed the lack of resistance to the Nazis on the totalitarian thought of these philosophers.
The New Philosophers are adherents of the ideals of a liberal democracy. They advocate free expression of opinion, the right to strikes and demonstrations, and human rights. 22 Their view corresponds to the assumption that the media combine knowledge and power without resorting to the mechanisms of the state apparatus in the process, which is why the New Philosophers are also glad to make themselves available for discussions and interviews that will be broadcast to the masses on television or through other media: the media are increasingly geared to the open market, not state totality, and they shape public opinion according to the interests and needs of society. In this way the media play an important role for the New Philosophers if they 22 Which is what distinguishes modern powers for Glucksmann: "It is not the absence or presence of state ('totalitarian') terrorism, which we find everywhere, but rather the conditions under which it is possible to struggle against this -the very concrete possibilities of communication one's opinion, of going on strike, of demonstrating, of examining the records of the powerful, of stopping a colonial or imperial war, or of preventing its secret commencement." (in: André Glucksmann: The Master Thinkers, p. 268).
want to be in the position as intellectuals to draw on opinion in order to strengthen the resistance against any political diktat or philosophical vision that derives from a strategist or master thinker.
The Split with Foucault
The "because there is no plan for a government and because the slogans are simple, there can be a that, by its own hand, shapes the relations of power that correspond to the knowledge, the Islamic faith, that they themselves have chosen.
The Islamic Revolution did not bring a new freedom to the Iranian people. Foucault's reports earned him much criticism, and he replied by stating plainly that he was opposed to any strategist -whether the religious leader, a follower of the shah, or anyone else -who urged revolution and claimed that "a particular death, a particular cry, a particular revolt" made no difference "compared to the great general necessity." 28 In line with the New Philosophers, Foucault not only spoke out against the propagation of a comprehensive strategy, but also considered that philosophy was always to be rejected as totalitarian thought when it did not see itself as a praxis that played a part in the struggle against power, since philosophy in such a case would not serve the resistance, but bring disaster. A philosopher must subject the demands and visions of his thought, the instruments of the knowledge that he constructs, to a practical test. He must himself implement the effects of his ideas in his experience, in order to find out whether they help, at particular points, to liberate oneself from the entanglements of power.
In "What is Enlightenment?," an article dating from 1984, Foucault makes clear the stance to which his path leads him as a critical thinker, stressing that "the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of anoth- tion 'is the fault of philosophers' (although it is not philosophers who lead it)." 31 The philosopher can condense the fundamental forces and thereby create the starting points for the change in historical relations, but he does not provide any prescriptions for sociopolitical transformation.
The philosopher qua philosopher is not a political activist, not a strategist of power, and not a spiritual adviser, but a creator. 36 The alternative Deleuze exhibits here thus appears to consist of presuming an unwritten doctrine. In actuality, such a presumption would probably have been unthinkable for him, regardless of whether Foucault had really given such great importance to his interviews. As far as Deleuze is concerned, after all, the unwritten half of Foucault's work must be that which opens up access to the fundamental interplay of forces. What Deleuze considers Foucault to have left out of his books is none other than philosophy, which, with its creative thinking, turns against the historical situation by setting out the starting points for the transformation of our society and our experience. To Deleuze, the alternative to the problems with which he is confronted by Foucault's thought can be none other than to presume that his own philosophy represents the outline of that plane that Foucault also viewed as having laid the foundations for the field on which the network of power was constituted, and to which Foucault attested in interviews. 
